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Power-sharing government has returned to Northern Ireland following extensive
discussions and the recent publication of a document by the British and Irish
governments. Optimistically titled New Decade, New Approach, this was the
mechanism found to nudge the political parties back into government together
three years after the collapse of the Assembly. It is a lengthy text containing
many proposals, plans and initiatives; the relative incoherence is evidence of the
conflicting challenges faced. At the core of the dilemma is how to encourage the
representatives of the two main communities in Northern Ireland (nationalist-unionist)
to share power once again.
A system that could not cope
Things fell apart in January 2017 when the late Martin McGuinness (deputy First
Minister) resigned from office in frustration at the actions and behaviour of his
partners in government (the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)). The model of
government depends on the willingness of nationalists (those who support Irish
reunification) and unionists (those who support retaining the union with Britain) to
share power, or at least the main political representatives of both traditions. It was
plain by late 2016 and early 2017 that this was all coming under intense strain and it
eventually collapsed.
The mood at that time reflected a worry that many of the promises of the peace
process had not been delivered, and that too much was stalled within the complex
power-sharing arrangements. On matters of human rights, equality, parity of esteem,
mutual respect and the legacy of the conflict there was a view (particularly prevalent
in the nationalist community) that things were not working as anticipated. The
sense that there was also something troubling about the practical workings of
government was vindicated during an inquiry into the operation of a renewable
heating scheme. Evidence suggested a fundamental breakdown in basic standards
of good governance.
When combined with the pressures of Brexit, the reality was that the system could
not cope. The fact that Northern Ireland is being removed from the EU without its
consent (a majority voted to remain) exacerbated the challenges, not assisted by a
‘confidence and supply arrangement’ entered into between the Conservative Party
and the DUP in order to keep the former in government at Westminster. That has
now ended following the December 2019 General Election.
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A document with ‘something for everyone’
So, what has this deal done to create the conditions for return? First, remember that
this document was published by both governments, in advance of a deadline that
would have required fresh elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly. In addition to
the commitments provided by the governments it also contains their best guess on
what a compromise arrangement would look like. There is an element of ‘something
for everyone’, even if that ‘something’ falls far short of what was expected (for
example, on Irish language legislation and human rights).
Part 1 contains the ‘Priorities for the Restored Executive’ and deals with matters that
include health care, the transformation of public services and delivering a ‘fair and
compassionate society’. Part 2 is billed as a ‘Northern Ireland Executive Formation
Agreement’. Here the focus is on renewing government through an emphasis
on transparency and accountability. Ministerial accountability and responsibility
feature heavily. Reform of the Petition of Concern (a safeguard mechanism built
into the Good Friday Agreement that was subject to extensive abuse by the DUP in
particular) did not go as far as expected, but the proposals are intended to ensure
that it is used less often and deployed as originally intended. Questions around the
sustainability and accountability of the institutions featured during the negotiations,
and there is a commitment now to a new Party Leaders’ Forum, an Executive Sub-
Committee on Brexit and an independent Fiscal Council. There is much detail about
the Programme for Government and the benefits of an outcomes-based approach
anchored in notions of societal well-being. A reference to the legacy of the conflict is
included, with the promise of legislation being taken forward at Westminster within a
defined timeframe.
There is a section on ‘Rights, Language and Identity’, with an agreement to establish
a new Office of Identity and Cultural Expression with the aim of, among other
things, enhancing respect for diversity. On the central matter of contention around
the Irish language there will be legislation that will create a new Irish Language
Commissioner with a variety of functions. There will also be a Commissioner for the
Ulster/Scots – Ulster/British tradition. The route to achieving this reform is through
amendment of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (the legislation that implemented
aspects of the Good Friday Agreement). The stalled Bill of Rights process is given
new life with a proposal for a Northern Ireland Assembly Ad Hoc Committee to be
assisted by five experts jointly appointed by the First and deputy First Ministers.
The document ends with detailed commitments from the British government and the
Irish government in order to underpin the various proposals, promises and plans.
This outlines things that they will address, the sense that they intend to keep a closer
watch on power-sharing this time around, and that support provided will come with
conditions. There is reference to many existing and future initiatives, with the Irish
government noting its support for a wide range of projects on the island of Ireland.
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Not the end of disagreement and dispute
How should this all be viewed and how might it be understood? Although it follows
extensive discussions and negotiations with the political parties, this document
was produced by both governments. Essentially this involved the British and Irish
governments confronting the political parties with a choice: return to power-sharing
government or face an election. The carefully constructed and nurtured civic and
media pressure is a case study in how governments can mould public narratives
to suit their desired ends. Almost every problem in Northern Irish society was
misleadingly blamed on the lack of a regional government. That will now create
its own problems for the new government, with the level of public expectation
heightened. In the end the British and Irish governments won. They got what they
wanted, and now Northern Ireland has a functioning Assembly and Executive in
place.
Disagreement and dispute will continue, with the British government in particular,
but also between the parties themselves. Much remains to be delivered, and there
is plenty of scope for old antagonisms to resurface rapidly. It is difficult to predict
how constitutional and political relationships will evolve. Post-Brexit life will, for
example, have a fundamental impact on what happens next. The fact that the UK is
leaving without the consent of two constituent parts (Scotland and Northern Ireland)
will not be forgotten by those who do not cherish the peculiarities of continuing
membership of the ‘union state’ (UK). People in Northern Ireland are used to the idea
that unionism is a partial political position, but it is not apparent that this awareness
extends to Westminster and Whitehall, particularly in their dealings with Scotland.
It may be that thoughts turn, on the island of Ireland, to reunification and finding
a way back to the EU. That conversation has intensified since the Brexit vote and
momentum will likely continue to build. The constitutional politics of Scotland and the
island of Ireland may feature prominently in the decade ahead.
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